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LEGISLATION
SECTION 102 AND THE FORBIDDEN PURPOSE
Introduction
The authors of the first modern income tax law,' conscious of
forbidding practical difficulties and perhaps influenced by the existing
English law, never considered taxing corporate income directly to the
stockholders.2 Thus, as if by default, the doctrine that corporations
are taxable entities, separate and distinct from their shareholders,
found its way into the federal tax structure. With but a few notable
exceptions,3 this doctrine has survived until the present time.4 Ac-
cordingly, it has been the theory of the income tax laws to tax cor-
porate profits immediately to the corporation, and their receipt to
the stockholders only upon distribution as dividends. Under such a
system, when higher rates of tax are imposed on individuals than on
corporations,6 it is obviously advantageous for the individual to use
the corporate personality to collect his income. The retention, rather
than the distribution, of earnings by the corporation would enable the
investor to avoid personal income taxes on the accumulated profits
which he may neither presently need nor desire.7 This initial post-
ponement of the receipt of income is not the only benefit gained by
the stockholder; he is also free to select less tax-burdensome methods 8
1 Revenue Act of 1913, § hA, 38 STAT. 114, 166 (1913).
2 Ballantine, Corporate Personality in Income Taxation, 34 HARv. L. REv.
573, 574 (1921).3 Prominent among the corporations meriting special tax treatment are
personal service corporations, INT. REv. CoDE §§ 391-396, and personal holding
corporations id. §§ 500-511.
4 Stickefls, Corporate Entity and Taxation, 29 B. U. L. Rnv. 486 (1949);
see Finkelstein, The Corporate Entity and the Income Tax, 44 YALE L. J. 436
(1935).
5 Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U. S. 693, 699 (1943).
6 Compare INT. REv. CoDE §§ 11 and 12 (tax on individuals), with §§ 13,
15 and 430 (tax on corporations). The imposition of the excess profits tax
and higher normal and surtax rates on corporations has reduced the usual dis-
parity between the tax rates.
7 Rudick, Section 102 and Personal Holding Company Provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code, 49 YALE L. J. 171 (1939).
8 The sale of the now more valuable shares enables the stockholder to
realize these profits, subject only to the smaller capital gains tax. ITT. REV.
CODE § 117. If the shares are held and transmitted on the stockholder's death,
their basis for capital gains purposes in the hands of the heirs is the fair
market value of the stock at time of death. Id. § 113 (a) (5).
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or occasions 9 to receive these earnings. The judicious use of such a
plan could conceivably result in a substantial reduction in the in-
vestor's tax burden.
The Congressional desire for an administratively simple tax
statute did not blind its members to the possible misuse of the cor-
porate presence. The threat presented to the taxing power and to
the governmental fiscal policy has always been recognized. 10 As a
result, provisions designed to prevent the improper retention of cor-
porate earnings have been included in all the Revenue Acts.", Section
102 of the Internal Revenue Code is the present contraceptive provi-
sion which imposes a deterring penalty tax on corporations whose
use as a convenient storehouse for unwanted earnings was prompted
by the shareholders' desire for smaller personal taxes. The statute 12
declares any accumulation of earnings by a corporation to be wrong-
ful, and therefore subject to a penalty, 13 when made with the inten-
tion of 'preventing the imposition of surtaxes upon its shareholders.
The assessment of the penalty tax against the corporation 14 acts to
reduce or eliminate the disparity between the individual tax rate and
that of the corporation. Once the opportunity to reduce tax expense
is lost, the incentive for the wrongful use of the corporate entity is
removed and the effectiveness of the Revenue Act thereby restored.
After a lifetime of almost forty years, it seems reasonable to ex-
pect that Section 102 would provide a satisfactory solution to the
corporate entity "loophole." Unfortunately, however, its administra-
9 Dividends may be declared in years when the stockholder's other income
has declined, when personal needs are greater or when individual tax rates are
lower.
2o Rudick, supra note 7, at 172.
11 Buck and Shackelford, Retention of Earnings by Corporations Under the
Income Tax Laws, 36 VA. L. REv. 141 (1950). This article contains an ex-
cellent summary of the legislative and administrative history of Section 102.
12 "There shall be levied, collected and paid for each taxable year [a surtax]
... upon the net income of every corporation . . . if such corporation ... is
formed or availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax
upon its shareholders or the shareholders of any other corporation through the
medium of permitting earnings or profits to accumulate instead of being divided
or distributed . . . ." INT. REY. CODE § 102 (a). While the tax is placed on
corporations "formed" as well as "availed of" for the wrongful purpose, cases
seldom arise where the formation of the corporation has been sufficient to sus-
tain the penalty. See Nipoch Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 B. T. A. 662, 668
(1937). This discussion is therefore limited to corporations "availed of" for
the forbidden use.
13 The penalty surtax is levied against the undistributed "section 102 net
income" as defined by § 102(d). The present surtax rates are 27/2% and
38Y2%. INT. Rav. CODE § 102 (a).
14 The Revenue Acts from 1913 to 1918 imposed the penalty directly on
the stockholder by adding to his income his aliquot share of the corporation's
net earnings. The decision in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920),
created doubt as to the constitutionality of this method and the penalty there-
after was shifted to the corporation. Buck and Shackelford, supra note 11,
at 159-161. There is some support for the belief that a return to the original
method of taxing would be constitutional. Rudick, supra note 7, at 218.
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tive history has been filled with uncertainty 'i and the problems raised
by its presence are many and deep-rooted. 16 But in spite of these
difficulties, the courts have interpreted its provisions, and have out-
lined its applicability to particular fact situations in a manner which
permits a general, yet definite, analysis. It is the purpose here to
examine the statute, in the light of these interpretations, with em-
phasis on the statutory test for determining corporate liability and
the methods devised to enable the section to effectively fulfill its vital
function.
The Touchstone of Liability
The touchstone of liability under Section 102 is the purpose
behind the accumulation of the income and not the consequences of
the accumulation.'7 It must be the intention of the stockholders to
evade the payment of personal income taxes,' 8 and this aim must be
accomplished by permitting the earnings to lie in the corporate
treasury instead of being distributed to the stockholders.' 9 It is not
enough that earnings have accumulated and that, as a result, the
stockholders' tax burden has been lessened.2 0  Before the corpora-
tion can be subject to the statutory penalty, the court must find as a
matter of fact that the condemned intention existed.21  As aids in
determining the state of mind of the stockholder-director, the courts
have properly relied on the circumstantial factors surrounding, and
arising out of, the taxpayer's actions.2 2  Care has been taken to dis-
tinguish between "purpose" and "effect"; yet the inference that the
effect of a voluntary act is among the purposes of the
actor ... ,, 23 has been correctly considered.
15 Cary, Accuinulations Beyond the Reasonable Needs of the Business: The
Dilemma of Section 102(C), 60 H. v. L. REv. 1282 (1947).
26 The theory of Section 102, viz., to force dividend distributions, conflicts
with some well founded theories. Among these may be included the following:
the acknowledged right of every business to grow. See William C. De Mille
Productions, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 B. T. A. 826, 830 (1934); the discre-
tionary power of management to determine whether dividends are to be de-
clared, and the economic importance of "ploughed back" earnings. Discussions
of these points, which are not covered herein, may be found in Heninger,
Federal Taxation of Corporate Surpluses, 28 IowA L. REv. 639 (1943) ; Lasser
and Holzman, The 102 Cases, 3 TAx L. REv. 119 (1947); and 57 YALE L. J.
474 (1948).
17 7 MERTENs, LAw oF FEDxaA INcomE TA XATIoN § 40.08 (1943).
18 Heninger, supra note 16, at 639, 640.
19 INT. REv. CODE § 102(a).
20 R. L. Blaffer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 851 (1938), aff'd, 103
F. 2d 487 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 576 (1939).
21 Chicago Stock Yards Co. v. Commissioner, 129 F. 2d 937 (lst Cir. 1942),
rev'd on, other grounds, Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U. S. 693
(1943).
22 See Rudick, supra note 7, at 189.
23 R. L. Blaffer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 851, 856 (1938).
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The corporation has the burden of coming forward with the
proof 24 and of overcoming the inference of forbidden purpose which
arises from a reduction in its stockholders' tax burden.2 5 Here, as
in tax cases generally, a determination by the Commissioner that the
corporation possessed the interdicted purpose is presumed to be cor-
rect and must be disproven by competent evidence. 26  First the tax-
payer, and then the Commissioner, offer evidence which is usually
circumstantial in nature since it seeks to prove a state of mind.
While these circumstantial factors vary in every case and those which
are important in one situation may be unimportant in another, all of
the cases have shown that the corporation involved was closely-held
or closely-controlled. 27 The other circumstantial factors may be
generally grouped into three classifications: first, those which help
prove the presence of the wrongful intent; second, those establishing
lack of intent; and third, those with little or no evidentiary value.
Among those factors which help prove the wrongful intent have
been: loans to shareholders or the expenditure of corporate funds for
their personal benefit; 28 investment of undistributed earnings in
assets having no reasonable connection with the business; 2 9 and a
showing that the stockholders, who saved the income tax, 0 had no
24U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.102-2 (1943).
25 Since the statute was designed to prevent tax savings by stockholders
through the withholding of corporate dividends, it seems patently inapplicable
when no tax saving is accomplished. See A. D. Saenger, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 84 F. 2d 23, 24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 577 (1936).
26 See note 24 supra.
27 See chart of decisions, Buck and Shackelford, supra note 11, at 353
(appendix).2 8 Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U. S. 282 (1938); Whitney
Chain & Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F. 2d 936 (2d Cir. 1945);
J. M. Perry & Co. v. Commissioner, 120 F. 2d 123 (9th Cir. 1941); United
Business Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 62 F. 2d 754 (2d Cir. 1933);
Christmann Veneer & Lumber Co., 4 CCH 1945 TC MEm. DEC. 529 (1945);
U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.102-2 (1943).29 Helvering. v. National Grocery Co., supra note 28; Whitney Chain &
Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 28; Becton, Dickinson & Co.
v. Commissioner, CCH 1942 BTA MEm. DEC. 12,800-A (1942), aff'd, 134
F. 2d 354 (3d Cir. 1943); Eastern Railway & Lumber Co., 12 T. C. 869
(1949); U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.102-2 (1943).
30 INT. REV. CODE § 148(c) requires that the Commissioner, on request, be
provided with a statement of accumulated corporate earnings and the names
of shareholders entitled to the same on distribution, together wvith the amount
payable to each. This information enables the Commissioner to compute and
offer as evidence the tax saving produced. Courts have considered the tax
saving as evidence of the wrongful intent. Helvering v. National Grocery Co.,
304 IJ. S. 282 (1938); World Publishing Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp.
886 (N. D. Okla. 1947), aft'd, 169 F. 2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U. S. 911 (1949); McCutchin Drilling Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d
480 (5th Cir. 1944); Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 46 B. T. A. 346(1942), aff'd, 137 F. 2d 424 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 799 (1943).
But cf. Wean Engineering Co., 2 CCH 1943 TC MEM. DEC. 510 (1943); Dietze
& Co., 1 CCH 1942 TC MEm. DEC. 93 (1942). See note 25 supra.
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need for additional income by way of dividends.3 1 The source of
earnings,82 a change to a conservative dividend policy when individual
tax rates increase 8 3 and a radical change in the business enterprise
after profits have been accumulated 3 4 have also been said to evidence
the objectionable design.
The mere absence of the items proving intent,35 the retention of
a surplus reasonably necessary for business needs,36 and the setting
of the dividend policy by a minority stockholder or by one who
benefits but little from the failure to distribute.3 7 constitute the factors
showing lack of intent. The group of relatively unimportant elements
includes the categorical denial of the illegal objective by a managing
stockholder, 38 and the distribution by the corporation of a "large
portion" of its earnings for the year in question.39
Even though the test of liability is the intention motivating the
corporate course of action,40 the aim of avoiding surtaxes need not
be the only or even predominant reason for withholding dividends. 41
"It is sufficient if it is one of the determining purposes.... ."; 4 indeed
it has been said that the taxpayer must prove a complete lack of the
condemned intent.43  Even a valid, demonstrated purpose for the
3'World Publishing Co. v. United States, supra note 30; Trico Products
Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 30.
32R._ & L., Inc. v. Commissioner, 84 F. 2d 721 C(5th Cir. 1936) ; see Cali-
fornia Motor Transport Co. Ltd., 1 CCH 1943 TC May. D~c. 974, 979 (1943).33 See United Business Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 62 F. d 754,
755 (2d Cir. 1933).
34 U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.102-3 (1943).
35 Lane Drug Co., 3 CCH 1944 TC Mnm. DEc. 394 (1944); Metal Mould-
ings Corp., 1 CCH 1943 TC MEm. Dc. 616 (1943); Flint Ink Co., CCH
1942 BTA MEm. DEC. 1 12,591-B (1942).
36 United States v. R. C. Tway Coal Sales Co., 75 F. 2d 336 (6th Cir. 1935);
William C. Atwater & Co., 10 T. C. 218 (1948).
7 Universal Steel Co., 5 T. C. 627 (1945); Smokeless Fuel Co., 2 CCH
1943 TC MEm. DEc. 794 (1943).
38 "The testimony of interested witnesses . . . must be given consideration
and accorded the weight to which it is entitled but it may be less persuasive
than the surrounding circumstances." World Publishing Co. v. United States,
72 F. Supp. 886, 889 (N. D. Okla. 1947), aff'd, 169 F. 2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 335 U. S. 911 (1949). Accord, Gibbs & Cox, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 2 CCH 1943 TC MEm. DEC. 688 (1943), aff'd, 147 F. 2d 60 (2d Cir.
1945). See Hanovia Chemical & Manufacturing Co., 2 CCH 1943 TC MEre.
DEc. 822 (1943); Florida Iron & Metal Co. of Jacksonville, CCH 1942 BTA
MEm. DEC. 12,585-B (1942).
39 See 'note 24 supra.
40 Cecil B. De Mille Productions, Inc. v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 1161
(1935), aff'd, 90 F. 2d 12 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 713 (1937).4 1 Trico Products Corp. v. McGowan, 67 F. Supp. 311 (W. D. N. Y. 1946),
aff'd, 169 F. 2d 343 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 899 (1948).42 World Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F. 2d 186, 189 (10th Cir.
1948).
4 R. L. Blaffer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 851, 856 (1938),
aff'd, 103 F. 2d 487 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 576 (1939). See Whitney
Chain & Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T. C. 1109 (1944), aff'd, 149
F. 2d 936 (2d Cir. 1945).
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retention of earnings might be ". . . not inconsistent with another
purpose to reduce income taxes .... ,4
Statutory Aids for Proving Intent
The nebulous nature of the test of liability and the almost com-
plete reliance upon circumstantial proof convinced Congress that the
Commissioner needed additional aid in enforcing Section 102.4 5 The
assistance provided consisted of two statutory presumptions in the
Commissioner's favor which relate to the forbidden purpose and by
which guilt is imputed to the corporation. 4" The effect of both pre-
sumptions has been to ease greatly the Commissioner's burden of
proof while concomitantly increasing that of the taxpayer; the effect
of the second inference frequently has been to change the question of
fact to be litigated.
The first of these presumptions is limited to mere "holding" T
or "investment" 48 companies and makes the nature of these corpora-
tions ". . . prima facie evidence of a purpose to avoid surtax upon
shareholders." 49 Such a provision gives ". . . further weight to the
presumption of correctness already arising from the Commissioner's
determination... ," ro of the illegal purpose and is in the nature of an
"additional presumption." 51 To overcome its force, the taxpayer
must show by clear and convincing evidence that the corporation was
not used to avoid personal surtaxes.52
The second, and more important, of these presumptions applies
to all corporatio'ns, 58 including operating companies. It declares that
the accumulation of corporate earnings or profits, beyond reasonable
business needs, shall be "determinative" of the purpose to avoid sur-
tax unless, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, the corporation
44 Nipoch Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 B. T. A. 662, 668 (1937).
45 See Rudick, supra note 7, at 185.
46 Ibid.
47 "A corporation having practically no activities except holding property
and collecting the income therefrom or investing therein .... " U. S. Treas.
Reg. 111, §29.102-2 (1943).
48 A corporation whose "... activities further include, or consist substan-
tially of, buying and selling stocks, securities, real estate, or other investment
property ... so that the income is derived not only from the investment yield
but also from profits upon market fluctuations .... " U. S. Treas. Reg. 111,
§ 29.102-2 (1943).4 9 INT. REv. CODE § 102-b. "[T]here has been no current objection to sub-
section (b), which provides that the fact that any corporation is merely a
holding or investment company shall be prima facie evidence of the purpose
to avoid surtax. This subsection strikes at the most obvious technique of
avoidance." Cary, supra note 15, at 1283.
50U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.102-2 (1943).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 The statute expressly fails to cover personal holding companies or foreign
personal holding companies. INT. Rxv. CODE § 102(a). It also fails to apply
to corporations exempt from ordinary corporate tax and those corporations
formed to avoid imposition of surtaxes in a way other than by accumulating
earnings. 7 MERTNs, op. cit. supra note 17, § 40.01.
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proves that no such purpose exists.54 This does not mean that an
excessive accumulation of profits will automatically subject the cor-
poration to the penalty. Under the proper conditions, that is, when
the improper objective is missing, no tax will apply.55 The statute
does mean, however, that when the Commissioner has proven an un-
reasonable " retention of earnings, a heavy and frequently unbearable
burden of proof 57 is placed on the accused taxpayer.
Before this burden can pass to the corporation, the court must
solve a new question of fact, viz., "'Were earnings accumulated be-
yond business needs?" In the solution of this problem, courts have
realized that there is no rigid formula nor set standards of measure-
ment to be relied upon.58 Each case must turn on its own facts.
Therefore, because the statute makes the determination of possible
excess retention a judicial question,5 9 judges have cast themselves in
the roles of corporate managers and, acting in said roles, have care-
fully weighed the individual corporate resources and earnings against
the corporate needs.
In the judicial evaluation of resources and earnings, reliance has
been placed upon the size of the corporate surplus,60 and the amount
of cash and other "quick assets" available.61 The nature of the
business, 62 earnings 63 and their predictability, 4 especially in face of
5 4 INTr. REv. CoDE § 102(c). This language was incorporated into the law
in 1938. Revenue Act of 1938, § 102(c), 52 STAT. 483 (1938). Prior to that
time, the law provided that the accumulation of earnings beyond reasonable
business needs created only a prima facie presumption of the prohibited pur-
pose. Although the change was dismissed lightly at the time (Rudick, supra
note 7, at 179) the rationale of the great majority of decisions now emphasizes
unreasonable accumulation rather than intent. 57 YAL.E L. J. 474, 477 (1948).
155World Publishing Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 886 (N. D. Okla.
1947).
56U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.102-3 (1943), expressly permits the proper
accumulation of income, if ". . . retained for working capital needed by the
business; or if invested in additions to plant reasonably required by the business;
or if in accordance with contract obligations placed to the credit of a sinking
fund for the purpose of retiring bonds issued by the corporation."
57 See note 24 supra.
58 Universal Steel Co., 5 T. C. 627 (1945).
59 World Publishing Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 886 (N. D. Okla.
1947), aff'd, 169 F. 2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 911 (1949).
60 World Publishing Co. v. United States, supra note 59; United States v.
R. C. Tway Coal Sales Co., 75 F. 2d 336 (6th Cir. 1935); Hanovia Chemical &
Manufacturing Co., 2 CCH 1943 TC Mazs. Dac. 822 (1943); Metal Mouldings
Corp., 1 CCH 1943 TC MEm. Dzc. 616 (1943).61 Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U. S. 282 (1938) ; United Block
Co. v. Helvering, 123 F. 2d 704 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U. S. 812(1942); J. M. Perry & Co. v. Commissioner, 120 F. 2d 123 (9th Cir. 1941);
Syracuse Stamping Co., 4 CCH 1945 TC MEm. DEc. 371 (1945); John F.
Boyle CO., 3 CCH 1944 TC MEm. Dsc. 1335 (1944).62 See note 34 supra.63 Beim Co. v. Landy, 113 F. 2d 897 (8th Cir. 1940) ; Plant Shipping Co.,
CCH 1942 BTA Mzm. DEc. 12,500-E (1942).6 4 Wean Engineering Co., 2 CCH 1943 TC MEm. Dzc. 510 (1943) ; Becton,
Dickinson & Co. v. Commissioner, CCH 1942 BTA MFM. DEc. 112,800-A
(1942), aff'd, 134 F. 2d 354 (3d Cir. 1943).
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hazardous business 65 or world conditions, 66 have been considered.
The inclusion among the assets of investments in unrelated enter-
prises 67 or accounts receivable arising from loans to or on behalf of
stockholders 68 have been treated as indicative of unwarranted ac-
cumulations which served no lawful business purpose.
69
Estimates of business needs have similarly been based on sound
management principles. The importance of a good financial position 7
0
to fulfill expansion needs,71 the necessity of modernizing and improv-
ing plant facilities, 72 and the providing of adequate reserves against
possibly injurious litigation, 73 unfavorable legislation,74 or other
hazards 75 have been properly weighed by the courts. Business has
been given a right to grow,'7 but its needs must be immediate,
77
definite,78 rather than nebulous, 70 and within the reasonable pursuit
65 Universal Steel Co., 5 T. C. 627 (1945); T. Smith & Son, Inc., 2 CCH
1943 TC MEm. DEC. 740 (1943); Millane Nurseries & Tree Experts, Inc.,
1 CCH 1942 TC MEm. DEc. 228 (1942).66 Dietze & Co., 1 CCH 1942 TC MEm. DEC. 93 (1942) ; see Lion Clothing
Co., 8 T. C. 1181 (1947).67 Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U. S. 282 (1938) ; Olin Corp. v.
Commissioner, 128 F. 2d 185 (7th Cir. 1942); J. M. Perry & Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 120 F. 2d 123 (9th Cir. 1941); Eastern Railway & Lumber Co., 12
T. C. 869 (1949).
6s KOMA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 390 (10th Cir. 1951) ; McCutchin
Drilling Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d 480 (5th Cir. 1944); Wilkerson Daily
Corp. v. Commissioner, 125 F. 2d 998 (9th Cir. 1942); Hut Neckwear Co.,
10 CCH 1951 TC MEm. DEC. 801 (1951); Southland Industries, Inc., 5 CCH
1946 TC MEm. DEC. 950 (1946); William C. De Mille Productions, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 30 B. T. A. 826 (1934).69 Whitney Chain & Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T. C. 1109
(1944), aff'd, 149 F. 2d 936 (2d Cir. 1945).
70W. S. Farish & Co. v. Commissioner, 104 F. 2d 833 (5th Cir. 1939),
aGfirming 38 B. T. A. 150 (1938).
71.J L. Goodman Furniture Co., 11 T. C. 530 (1948); Syracuse Stamping
Co., 4 CCH 1945 TC MEm. DEC. 371 (1945); General Smelting Co., 4 T. C.
313 (1944).
72 John F. Boyle Co., 3 CCH 1944 TC MEm. DEc. 1335 (1944); T. Smith
& Son, Inc., 2 CCH 1943 TC MEm. DEc. 740 (1943); Metal Mouldings
Corp., 1 CCH 1943 TC MEM. DEC. 616 (1943).
73 William C. Atwater & Co., 10 T. C. 218 (1948).
74 Albert L. Allen Co., 3 CCH 1944 TC MEmx. DEc. 1246 (1944); see World
Publishing Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 886, 894 (N. D. Okla. 1947).
75 Lion Clothing Co., 8 T. C. 1181 (1947) ; Bosch Brewing Co., CCH 1942
BTA MEm. DEC. 1 12,592-M (1942).
76 William C. De Mille Productions, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 B. T. A. 826
(1934).
77 World Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F. 2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948).
7sKOMA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 189 F. 2d 390 (10th Cir. 1951); Sema-
graph Co. v. Commissioner, 152 F. 2d 62 (4th Cir. 1945); Colonial Amuse-
ment Corp., 7 CCH 1948 TC MEm. DEC. 546 (1948).
7 Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Commissioner, CCH 1942 BTA MEm. DEc.
f 12,800-A (1942), aff'd, 134 F. 2d 354 (3d Cir. 1943).
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of the corporate business.80 Where the litigant corporation has had
but one stockholder, courts have said that the need for capital could
be as easily met by distributing earnings to its owner, to be returned
when the need is pressing, as it could by leaving funds in the
treasury."'
If, after an examination of all the evidence, the court finds that
earnings were needlessly accumulated, the statute treats such finding
as "determinative" of the forbidden purpose.8 2 The taxpayer must
then prove, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, that this un-
reasonable retention was not prompted by the illegal motive.8 3
Treasury Department regulations declare that such proof must show
that ". . . the absence of such a purpose is unmistakable." 84 While it
has not been impossible for the corporation to sustain this burden,",
the invocation of the "complete absence of purpose" rule makes the
task a very difficult one. Director-stockholders have seemingly been
charged with knowledge that the failure to distribute earnings re-
sulted in smaller personal taxes.8 6 The courts treat this knowledge
as evidence of one of the purposes of the director-stockholder's failure
to act,87 and impute such possible purpose to the corporation. Since
80 World Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F. 2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948);
U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.102-2 (1943).8 2 Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U. S. 282 (1938) ; Southland In-
dustries, Inc., 5 CCH 1946 TC MEm. DEc. 950 (1946).82
INT. REv. CODE § 102(c).
83 Ibid.
84U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.102-2 (1943). "[T]he Treasury Department
is really changing the statute to read that the taxpayer must clearly prove the
absence of any surtax avoidance motive instead of merely proving its absence
by a 'clear preponderance of the evidence.' There is a definite difference in
degree betwen clear proof and a clear preponderance." Buck and Shackelford,
supra note 11, at 327-328.85 Gus Blass Co., 9 T. C. 15 (1947). Court found an unreasonable reten-
ion of earnings for the fiscal year ending January 31, 1941 but held there was
no intention to avoid surtaxes on stockholders. Evidence showed (1) peti-
tioner awaited final audit report in order to definitely ascertain net profits,(2) later distribution almost equalled net profits, and (3) such distribution was
included in the stockholders' incomes for calendar year 1941, as would have
been the case if the dividends had been declared during the corporation's fiscal
period. It is submitted that the combination of fortuitous circumstances relied
upon is indicative of the unusual evidence necessary to sustain the burden of
proof.
86 "The stockholders knew that distributions would have increased their
surtaxes. As petitioner's counsel state, 'Obviously they were not morons'"
Gibbs & Cox, Inc. v. Commissioner, 2 CCH 1943 TC MEm. DEC. 688, 698
(1943), aff'd, 147 F. 2d 60 (2d Cir. 1945).
87 "[Bly refraining from distributing any of the earnings the stockholders
have avoided substantial surtaxes. That was the effect of their action, and an
ordinary presumption is that the effect is among the purposes of the actor."
Gibbs & Cox, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 86.
"The fact that the taxed surplus ... was accumulated . . . and the further
fact that plaintiff's six largest stockholders ...saved a large federal income
tax that would have been imposed upon them had the taxed surplus been dis-
tributed, is enough to uphold the taxes in question." Trico Products Corp. v.
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any showing of the proscribed purpose, unless negated, is apparently
sufficient to support the imposition of the penalty, the corporation's
attempts to disprove both the statutory determination of purpose and
the evidence of purpose, arising through knowledge,88 must generally
fail. It is submitted that, in the great majority of instances, the de-
termination of purpose, arising from a finding of unreasonable ac-
cumulation, is not merely determinative until disproven, but is, for
practical purposes, a conclusive finding.
Although the determination of an unreasonable accumulation is
almost inevitably followed by a finding of the wrongful purpose,89 an
unreasonable accumulation is not, in itself, another touchstone of
liability.90 The proper test is, and has always been, the "purpose to
avoid" surtaxes; the retention of profits is only proof of that pur-
pose.91 But the nearly irrefutable nature of this proof rescues the tax
authorities from the difficulties of establishing a state of mind by cir-
cumstantial evidence. Confident that a corporation will but rarely 92
escape liability after an unnecessary accumulation, the Commissioner
primarily seeks to prove that such an accumulation has occurred.
This attempt makes the essential question to be litigated the more
objective one of whether earnings were unnecessarily retained. 93
While this question is at best an abstraction,94 its solution clearly
involves less difficult evidentiary problems than those encountered in
establishing a subjective intention.95  Moreover, its adoption by the
courts as a compelling criterion of liability 9 makes the question of
an alleged unreasonable accumulation the problem usually 97 presented
before the court for a corporate 98 answer.
McGowan, 67 F. Supp. 311, 325 (W. D. N. Y. 1946), aff'd, 169 F. 2d 343
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 899 (1948).88 
"It seems to us that a naive and credulous tribunal would be required for
the assumption that in the confirmed practice of methodical accumulation there
was no taint of a purpose to procure so desirable a monetary result for the
individuals responsible for the petitioner's decisions." Trico Products Corp.
v. Commissioner, 46 B. T. A. 346, 380 (1942), aff'd, 137 F. 2d 424 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U. S. 799 (1943).
89 See Buck and Shackelford, Retention of Earnings by Corporations Under
the Income Tax Laws, 36 VA. L. REv. 141, 337 (1950).90 Ibid.
91 See Cary, supra note 15, at 1289.
92 "[Blut none of these cases has concerned a corporation with its stock
widely-held and its control widely diversified." Buck and Shackelford, supra
note 89, at 337.
93 Cary, Section 102 May Not Be the Menace Some Tar Men Consider it
to Be, 89 J. ACCOUNTANCY 219 (1950).
94 Ibid.
95 "[T]he reasonable needs of a business ... [are] ... immediately within
the ken of the managers, [and] the supposititious standard, though indeed ob-
jective, being as accessible as those for example of the prudent driving of a
motor car ... ." United Business Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 62 F. 2d
754, 756 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 635 (1933).
98 57 YALE L. J. 474, 478 (1948).
97 See notes 54 and 93 supra.




It is easy to recognize the need for Section 102 and to applaud
the protection it provides for the tax revenues. The formulation of
its test of liability as the "purpose to avoid" personal taxes and the
establishment of the several presumptions as enforcement aids are,
in light of its important function, both necessary and proper. But,
while the statute discourages the misuse of the corporate entity, its
imposition is necessarily uncertain 19 and often in conflict with the
public policy of encouraging the growth and expansion of private
enterprise.100
The imposition of the penalty in any particular situation is un-
certain because the circumstantial factors which prove either the
illegal purpose or the unreasonable accumulation will vary with every
corporation.10' Although the factors may be identified from prior
decisions of the courts, no single factor nor combination thereof need
always be sufficient to support the penalty.10 2 Instead, their ma-
teriality, under a specific state of facts, cannot be conclusively deter-
mined until they are passed upon by the court. 10 3 Any determination
at that time, if unfavorable, is too late to help the corporation. 04  In
this way, director-stockholders, charged with setting a corporate divi-
dend policy and who may conceivably incur personal liability, 05
cannot tell whether the corporation is subject to a tax until it is be-
yond their power to provide a remedy.10 6
Under these conditions, and with little basis for knowing what
tests will be applied in deciding whether profits were needlessly
retained, 0 7 the director-stockholder is forced to act. Whenever rea-
sonable doubt arises as to the applicability of Section 102, dividend
distributions will probably be forthcoming. While this is the effect
that the statute was designed to produce, there is a very real danger
amine closely for the possible application of Section 102, see T. D. 4914, 1939-2
Cum. BULL. 108, and T. D. 5398, 1944-1 Cux. BuLr. 194.
9957 YALE L. 3. 474, 479, 480 (1948).
100 Cary, sapra note 15, at 1311.
101 See note 99 supra. See Rudick, supra note 7, at 182.
102 Buck and Shackelford, supra note 89, at 339-341.
203 See note 99 supra. As to the question of the review of Tax Court de-
cisions, it is provided: "The Courts of Appeals shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion to review the decisions of the Tax Court . . . in the same manner and
to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried with-
out a jury; and the judgment of any such court shall be final, except that it
shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon
certiorari ...... ITNT. REv. CoDE § 1141(a).
104 See Heninger, mipra note 16, at 640.
105 This problem, which arises upon the payment by the corporation of a
penalty tax under Section 102 is discussed in Note, 49 CoL L. REv. 394 (1949).
See also Lasser and Holzman, Personal Liability of Directors for Section 102
Surtaxes, 16 THE CoNTROLER 342 (1948).
106 See Heninger, supra note 16, at 640.
107 See note 15 supra.
19521
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
that funds which are actually needed for expansion or reserve pur-
poses will be distributed. The loss to the corporation of the use of
these funds must surely act to throttle business expansion and effect
productive employment. 0 8
Fortunately, however, the statute has been administered in an
unusually tolerant manner.10 9 Much of the fear created within the
ranks of corporate managers by a strict reading of the statute has
been dissipated by the temperate attitude of the courts and the Com-
missioner. The courts have adopted a generous interpretation of the
"reasonable needs" of a business 110 and have been reluctant to sub-
stitute their judgment for that of the directors."' In addition, the
decisions have carefully circumscribed the discretion of the tax au-
thorities in their enforcement of the statute.112  In a similarly
moderate manner, the Commissioner has sought to apply the penalty
only when "... a common-sense view of the whole picture makes it
reasonably clear that there was a tax avoiding purpose, and that the
reasons alleged for the accumulation are not reliable or sufficient" 113
The small number of deficiency letters issued annually under the
section," 4 and the failure to bring before a court even one corpora-
tion whose stock and control were both widely dispersed,115 point up
the limited enforcement measures undertaken by the Commissioner.
In short, a wise administrative policy has prevented Section 102 from
becoming either a present threat to business or an insurmountable
obstacle in the path of a growing enterprise.
VINDICATION OF FAmILY PARTNERSHIPS
The definition of "partner," as amplified by a recent amendment
to Section 3797 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code, now includes
a person who ". . . owns a capital interest in a partnership in which
108 See note 93 supra.
109 See Cary, supra note 93, at 220.
110 See Cary, supra note 15, at 1306. For examples of generous interpreta-
tions of business needs, see J. L. Goodman Furniture Co., 11 T. C. 530 (1948);
Lion Clothing Co., 8 T. C. 1181 (1947). A more restricted interpretation may
be found in World Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F. 2d 186 (10th Cir.
1948).
11" R. C. Tway Coal Sales Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 668 (W. D. Ky.
1933), aff'd, United States v. R. C. Tway Coal Sales, 75 F. 2d 336 (6th Cir.
1935); Lane Drug Co., 3 CCH 1944 TC MEm. DEc. 394 (1944).
112 See Cary, supra note 15, at 1307.
113 Miller, Improper Accumulation of Surplus-(2) The Lawyer's Task of
Giving Advice as to Current Dividend Policy, in View of Section 102 I.R.C.,
1 AmE UNIV. TAx INST. LECrTmUs 103, 110 (1948).
114 During the period from 1939 to 1947 less than 100 deficiency letters were
issued annually under the section. Id. at 111.
115 Covers the period from 1913 to 1950. See Buck and Shackelford, supra
note 89, at 337.
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